Recently, in Sci. Rep. 6 (2016) 28767, Li et al., have proposed a scheme for quantum key distribution using Bell states. This comment provides a proof that the proposed scheme of Li et al., is insecure as it involves leakage of information. Further, it is also shown that all the error rates computed in the Li et al.'s paper are incorrect as the authors failed to recognize the fact that any eavesdropping effort will lead to entanglement swapping. Finally, it is established that Li et al.'s scheme can be viewed as an incrementally (but incorrectly) modified version of the existing schemes based on Goldenberg Vaidman (GV) subroutine.
(| + + + | − − ), and send the second qubits of all the Bell pairs to Bob, who subsequently randomly measures his qubit in X basis or Z basis. Alice also performs the same measurement and they keep all those cases where the measurement basis used by them are the same. For eavesdropping check they may compare half the results, if no signature for eavesdropping is found their key will be exactly correlated. A scheme equivalent to this scheme, which is one step and uses EPR state, is discussed by some of the present authors as Protocol 2 in, 4 where to increase the efficiency, Bob used to announce his basis and Alice used to subsequently measure in the same basis. However, such a scheme is neither efficient (as it uses costly quantum resource, like entanglement, which is not required) nor novel (as the scheme is equivalent to BB84). The one step EPR-based scheme proposed by Li et al., is slightly different from this simple minded EPR-based one step scheme of QKD described above as in this case Bob performs Bell measurement. In what follows we would show that security of such a scheme appears from entanglement swapping. Unfortunately, Li et al., missed this point and analyzed the security of their protocol in analogy with BB84 scheme, and naturally such an incorrect analysis led to incorrect values of error rates. Before, we continue with our comments and analysis, for the sake of completeness of this comment, we would like to briefly describe Li et al.'s protocol.
Analysis of Li et al.'s protocol
Let us first summarize the first QKD protocol of Li et al., which requires memory. In fact, the protocol is nothing but a DSQC protocol proposed in the recent past by some of the present authors, 5 where Alice is sending random bits instead of a meaningful message. Specifically, Alice prepares a Bell state corresponding to each 2-bits of her key, i.e., |φ + , |φ − , |ψ + and |ψ − for sending 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively. This can also be viewed as Alice preparing N 2 copies of |φ + and applying Pauli operations I, Z, X and iY to encode 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively. Subsequently, she permutes the string of encoded particles and sends it to Bob, who uses memory to store the qubits other than decoy qubits. They proceed for final key generation only if the channel is ensured safe. It is worth noting here that a QKD protocol can be modified to a direct communication protocol by incorporating memory, whereas a direct communication protocol can always be converted to a QKD protocol if the sender sends random key rather sending a meaningful message.
The second protocol is a modification of the first protocol to circumvent the use of memory. Specifically, the authors tried to design an entangled-state-based protocol in analogy with BB84 protocol, where Alice prepares two Bell states for each 4-bits of her secret key and probabilistically swap the second particle of the first Bell state with the first particle of the second Bell state (or in other words, arrange the 4 particles in one of the following orders {(1, 2) , (3, 4)} or {(1, 3) , (2, 4)} , where the particles (1, 2) and (3, 4) are entangled with each other). This probabilistic swap is equivalent to a restricted randomization process that does not allow all possible permutations, for example, it does not allow {(1, 4) , (2, 3)} as a valid sequence. Thus, it leaves only two choices for Bob, i.e., either to measure the string as such ({(1, 2), (3, 4)}) or after swapping second and third qubits in the string ({(1, 3) , (2, 4)}). After repeating this procedure for all the key bits, Alice and Bob first check some of the decoy qubits, and if errors are low they proceed to key generation. In both the schemes proposed in Ref. 1 and summarized here, the authors claimed that the security arises due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and no-cloning. However, it should be noted that the security in a cryptographic protocol is achieved using splitting the useful information in 2 or more pieces, in such a way that unavailability of all these pieces makes it impossible to extract the secret. 5 For example, in BB84 protocol, Alice sends the quantum piece (qubits) to Bob and withholds classical information regarding choice of basis for each qubit. Similarly, in the present protocols, Alice withholds the classical information of order of permutation. This principle of origin of security due to temporal or spatial separation of entangled particles causing ignorance for an eavesdropper has been discussed in the past as GV subroutine in Refs. [5] [6] [7] [8] In GV subroutine, if Eve incorrectly chooses particles from two entangled states to measure in the basis they were initially prepared, then it causes entanglement swapping, which leaves detectable traces for the receiver. Interestingly, its equivalence with BB84 subroutine, in which single qubits are used as decoy qubit, has also been addressed over noisy channels in the recent past. 9 In GV subroutine and any other scheme, where particle order of entangled particles are permuted before transmitting through the channel, eavesdropping efforts lead to entanglement swapping and thus a detectable trace of eavesdropping.
Interestingly, the authors completely missed the role of entanglement swapping, which is reflected in the erroneous computation of error rates and mutual information. To visualize this point, let us look in Group 2 in 
Now, we can easily see that whatever be the measurement outcome of Eve, for an initial state |φ + 12 |ψ + 34 , Eve can never obtain |ψ + 12 |φ − 34 . A similar mistake can also be observed in Group 3 of Table 4 of Ref. 1 for Bob's measurement. From the above example, we can easily observe the following from the perspective of an eavesdropper. Half of the time she chooses the correct order of particles, and consequently obtains the right bit values, without leaving any detectable trace of her attack. However, in the remaining half of the cases (of the groups she intends to attack), she chooses the wrong order of particles, her measurement causes entanglement swapping (as discussed through Eqs. (1)- (4)). It is worth noting here, still 1/4 of the times she obtains the correct result, while she obtains wrong results on the remaining 3/4 cases. Therefore, she obtains the right bit values with probability . For instance, suppose Alice initially prepares |φ + |ψ + as discussed above and sends it to Bob, but the transmitted state is intercepted by Eve and measured in the Bell basis. Half of the time, when she chooses the correct particle order she obtains |φ + |ψ + , whereas in the remaining half of the cases her measurement would cause entanglement swapping, but still Eve obtains the correct result (i.e., |φ + |ψ + ) with 1 4 probability. Thus, in half of all the cases, Bob obtains incorrect result (i.e., traces of eavesdropping) with 3 4 probability. Therefore, an eavesdropping attack is detected with probability . Similar analysis would lead to the same result for other initial states, too, and we can easily observe that the value for the probability that Bob succeeds in detecting an eavesdropping attack (correct value Now to illustrate the leakage involved in this protocol, let us look at the right hand sides of Eqs. (1)- (4), where we can see that in each case, Eve obtains the correct result, i.e., the state prepared by Alice with probability 5 8 , while one of the 3 incorrect outcomes with probability 1 8 each. It is noteworthy that out of the 4 bits of classical information that Alice sends to Bob, most of it is leaked to Eve as her ignorance is only − 
Similarly, the error due to Eve's measurement, that is detected by Alice and Bob through a comparison is 3 f 8 . Therefore, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
Here 's incorrect analysis led to a similar value (11%). However, it would be apt to note that the e max reported here is valid only for a specific eavesdropping attack (measurement-resend attack), whereas for BB84 protocol, the same is known tightly for an arbitrary attack and the tolerable error limit against an arbitrary attack in BB84 is 11%. 10 Further, we would like to note that under measurement resend attack, often higher values of e max is found. For example, for Goldenberg Vaidman protocol 11 e max was computed to be 0.26 = 26%. 7 Finally, we would like to conclude this comment by noting that there is a class of quantum cryptographic schemes where particle order permutation (PoP) technique is used (see 6, 7, [12] [13] [14] [15] and references therein). This technique was introduced by Deng et al. 16 and is frequently used by us and others. 6, 7, [12] [13] [14] [15] In the set of all PoP based schemes, there is a subset of protocols, in which sender(s) initially create N 2 copies of a Bell state and after encoding her information (if needed) sends all the particles to Bob, but applies a permutation operator Π N before sending the sequence. Some of these Bell states are used as decoy qubits. Now, if Eve chooses, two qubits from the sequence that is transmitted through the channel the probability that the selected qubit is entangled (i.e., the probability that he performs a measurement in correct order) is only , which reduces exponentially with N and approaches zero for large N. As I(A : E) reduces, I(A : B) increases and consequently e max increases. This is in the heart of GV subroutine and PoP based schemes that uses Bell state (see our earlier works 6, 12, 13 and references therein). Thus, in Ref., 1 an effort has been made to slightly modify the existing PoP based schemes that use Bell state, without citing any of them. However, the modification led to leakage and a lower tolerable error rate under measurement-resend attack. Further, the main results of 1 are wrong as the authors failed to recognize the role of entanglement swapping in their scheme.
